Let me restate the argument. I think this is consistent with what Bach wrote:
1. Egoism is the view that one should always act in one’s self-interest. 2. Action A is of negligible cost to Eddie the Egoist. 3. Action A would greatly benefit countless others. 4. Action A will not (ex hypothesis) benefit Eddie. 5. 1 + 4 indicate that Eddie has no reason to take Action A. 6. Most think Eddie should take Action A. 7. 5 + 6: Egoism is incorrect.
I am not sure that (5) follows actually follows. It would only seem to follow if: a. Self-interest is construed purely in terms of some kind of exchangeable benefits. b. Only something being in one’s interest can count as a reason.
Why (a)?
Ex hypothesis, we are told that Eddie receives no benefit. This must, therefore, exclude the benefit of the knowledge that millions of lives were saved by your simple, costless action. Those receiving the benefits from action A are too far to distant to interact, so presumably the benefits must require interaction and exchange.
But why should we think one’s self-interest lies solely in these kinds of benefits? Spiritual benefit, for example, pride or joy in an action, do not require interaction and exchange and appear to be just as valid as things qualifying as in one’s interests.
If (a) is not required, then it looks one is begging the question by assuming the action is not in one’s interest. I presume, Bach, you are trying to find a counter-example where one’s interests are neutral: one does not gain, but there is no sacrifice of one’s interest either.
Why (b)?
If we are to say that this action is neutral in regards to Eddie’s interests and thus he has no reason to act, it must be that for there to be a reason to act it must be in Eddie’s interest. This is not, however, what (1) says. (1) says Eddie should always act in his interests, not that he must only act when it is in his interest. (1) excludes actions that are contrary to one’s interests, not actions that are merely consistent (one’s not explicitly or directly in one’s interest) or neutral with one’s interests. Saying that one should always wear a white shirt, doesn’t necessarily mean that they can’t also wear blue jeans. Whereas, saying one should only wear a t-shirt does mean that one cannot also wear blue jeans. If one’s self-interest and the interests of others were always mutually exclusive, then (1) could be read as saying only act in one’s self interest. But, this is not stated in the argument and, to boot, is false.
So, without (b), Eddie could have some other reason, not contrary to his interests, that could give him reason to push the button.
Lastly, it is hardly the case that if a theory goes against the common intuition in one extraordinary case that we conclude that theory to be wrong.
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Let me restate the argument. I think this is consistent with what Bach wrote:
1. Egoism is the view that one should always act in one’s self-interest.
2. Action A is of negligible cost to Eddie the Egoist.
3. Action A would greatly benefit countless others.
4. Action A will not (ex hypothesis) benefit Eddie.
5. 1 + 4 indicate that Eddie has no reason to take Action A.
6. Most think Eddie should take Action A.
7. 5 + 6: Egoism is incorrect.
I am not sure that (5) follows actually follows. It would only seem to follow if:
a. Self-interest is construed purely in terms of some kind of exchangeable benefits.
b. Only something being in one’s interest can count as a reason.
Why (a)?
Ex hypothesis, we are told that Eddie receives no benefit. This must, therefore, exclude the benefit of the knowledge that millions of lives were saved by your simple, costless action. Those receiving the benefits from action A are too far to distant to interact, so presumably the benefits must require interaction and exchange.
But why should we think one’s self-interest lies solely in these kinds of benefits? Spiritual benefit, for example, pride or joy in an action, do not require interaction and exchange and appear to be just as valid as things qualifying as in one’s interests.
If (a) is not required, then it looks one is begging the question by assuming the action is not in one’s interest. I presume, Bach, you are trying to find a counter-example where one’s interests are neutral: one does not gain, but there is no sacrifice of one’s interest either.
Why (b)?
If we are to say that this action is neutral in regards to Eddie’s interests and thus he has no reason to act, it must be that for there to be a reason to act it must be in Eddie’s interest. This is not, however, what (1) says. (1) says Eddie should always act in his interests, not that he must only act when it is in his interest. (1) excludes actions that are contrary to one’s interests, not actions that are merely consistent (one’s not explicitly or directly in one’s interest) or neutral with one’s interests. Saying that one should always wear a white shirt, doesn’t necessarily mean that they can’t also wear blue jeans. Whereas, saying one should only wear a t-shirt does mean that one cannot also wear blue jeans. If one’s self-interest and the interests of others were always mutually exclusive, then (1) could be read as saying only act in one’s self interest. But, this is not stated in the argument and, to boot, is false.
So, without (b), Eddie could have some other reason, not contrary to his interests, that could give him reason to push the button.
Lastly, it is hardly the case that if a theory goes against the common intuition in one extraordinary case that we conclude that theory to be wrong.
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